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Abstract
This work develops an agent-based model for the study of how the
leverage through the use of repurchase agreements can function as a
mechanism for the propagation and amplification of financial shocks
in a financial system. Based on the analysis of financial intermediaries
in the repo and interbank lending markets during the 2007-08 financial
crisis we develop a model that can be used to simulate the dynamics
of financial contagion.
Keywords: agent-based models, financial risk, computational eco-
nomics, financial contagion
1 Introduction
In recent years, the use of complex models for the analysis of financial
contagion in economic systems has become widely used. The recent 2007-08
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financial crisis, regularly attributed to the complex relationships among
financial institutions, has revived the interest in the role of the behavior of
market participants in the creation of the complex interlinkages which serve
as channels for the transmission and amplification of economic shocks.
The crisis, which started with a liquidity drain in the US sub-prime
mortgage market, due to the collapse of a bubble in the housing market,
quickly overflowed to debt markets and stock markets in a process of finan-
cial contagion that eventually prompted the downfall of major American
and European banks and triggered a world recession. The means by which
the crisis spread from a specific bubble to the whole financial system is what
we call financial contagion and it is a process made possible by the existing
interconnectivity between financial institutions.
Financial institutions are interconnected in a variety of ways, both
directly and indirectly. Direct interconnectedness happen mostly through
mutual credit exposures while indirect interconnectedness occurs mainly
through common asset holdings, margin call losses and haircut increases
triggered by fire sales and liquidity drain and information spillover (Liu
et al. (2015)).
Direct interconnectedness occurs because mutual credit exposures
between financial institutions can lead to domino effects. With the complex
chains of intermediation which exist in the global financial system, the
failure of a highly interconnected institution can cause major disruptions to
the financial system as a whole as this institution wouldn’t be able to fulfill
it’s obligations and cause mark-to-market losses in the balance sheets of all
other institutions with direct exposure to it, which could cause a number of
other institutions to face distress as well.
Indirect interconnectedness occurs as institutions facing distress can
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start fire selling it’s assets. Fire sales further stress the market prices of the
assets owned by the company, causing mark-to-market losses in all insti-
tutions with common asset holdings and causing increases in margin calls
and haircuts in repurchase agreements backed by these assets. Information
spillover can also cause other institutions with similar balance sheets to face
higher spreads.
As more institutions suffer losses and become distressed, market con-
ditions may further deteriorate via the aforementioned contagion channels,
leading to a negative feedback loop and, possibly, to a cascade of failures.
While many approches to understand the dynamics of financial conta-
gion using equation-based modeling have been developed, mostly through
economic and network models (see Gai and Kapadia (2010), Huang et al.
(2013) and Elliott et al. (2014)), these approaches have the limitation of re-
producing an homogenized and simplified approximation of the observed
reality, sometimes producing unrealistic models which are not sufficiently
justified (Helbing and Balietti (2010)).
In this work we focus on the prospects of the computer simulation
of economic systems to model the dynamics of financial contagion. Agent-
based modeling is a computational technique where the components of a
system are encapsulated as agents, which can represent individuals, groups,
companies and/or countries, while the analysis of the system is carried out
through the interactions of these agents (Helbing (2012)).
By modeling the financial system through the use of agents, we are
capable not only of creating simulations that reflect the interactions between
different entities more accurately, but also of testing the implications of
different hypothesis. We furthermore emphasize the importance of building
models using a range of empirical observations to design more realistic
3
models which are capable of representing market dynamics observed in
historical episodes and allows us to explore in more detail the dynamics of
financial markets.
In this work we focus on modeling one of the most prominent effects
of the 2007-08 financial crisis: the liquidity drain observed in the repurchase
agreement (repo) markets. During the crisis both interbank lending and
repurchase agreements shrank dramatically, causing a massive deleverage
in the financial system and threatening several banks with insolvency in a
movement that only stopped through a government bailout. To achieve this
objective we focus on the interaction between banks, money market funds
and hedge funds in the repo and interbank markets in order to recreate this
financial contagion movement.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we
introduce the problem of financial contagion and focus on the repo markets.
Section 3 discusses agent-based models of financial markets and how they
can be used to understand market dynamics such as the one we wish to
model. Section 4 presents our agent-based financial contagion model. In
Section 5 we perform some numerical simulations and discuss the results.
Finally, in Section 6 we discuss extensions of the proposed method and our
conclusions.
2 Financial Contagion
Strong financial contagion has been one of the key features of most recent
financial crises, as localized problems in certain segments of the markets
spread to other segments leading to the risk of cascading defaults and
failures which are often avoided through government bailouts of institutions
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deemed ”too big to fail.”
As described by Gorton and Metrick (2009), the panic of 2007-08
occurred through a run on the repo market. The repo market is very im-
portant market that provides collaterized financing for banks.They work
very much like bank deposits, but for firms operating in the capital markets.
In a repurchase agreement the bank sells a security with the promise of
repurchasing the security at a specified price in the end of the contract.
The intermediary buying the security from the bank is remunerated by the
spread in operation.
According to Gorton and Metrick (2009), in the last twenty-five years
a number of financial innovations have allowed traditional assets of banks
to be traded in capital markets through securitization and loan sales and
have allowed banks to leverage through these operations.
Since the 2007-08 crisis, the interconnected nature of financial mar-
kets has not only been studied as an explanation for the spread of risk and
losses throughout the system, but also motivated much of the policy rec-
ommendations in the aftermath. Yet, a framework to understand how the
dynamics of the network structure of the financial market, specially the repo
market, leads to systemic risk remains incomplete.
In a broader sense, there is currently a high level of uncertainty about
which elements in the structure of the financial system causes contagion and
how it occurs. Early work, prior to the crisis, focused on general aspects of
interbank lending such as the work of Allen and Gale (2000), which modeled
contagion as an equilibrium phenomenon caused by liquidity preference
shocks through economic regions, and of Rochet and Tirole (1996), which
considers the systemic risk created by interbank lending and investigates
whether decentralized bank interactions can be preserved while maintaining
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the stability of the system.
More recent work, such as Gai and Kapadia (2010), Acemoglu et al.
(2013) and Elliott et al. (2014) examine how shocks propagate through a
network based on debt holdings or interbank lending and, also, how shocks
propagate as a function of network architecture.
While these works have provided useful insights about financial
contagion (although presenting quite different and complementary results),
the use of economic equilibrium and network models have some limitations
in the study of the phenomenon. For instance, financial agents usually have
different goals and strategies, thus, behaving very differently. Also, we
must consider that the nature of debt exposures as connectivity measures
can also vary greatly, with mutual lending exposures, cross-holding of
shares, repurchase agreements and common asset holdinds of other sorts
(e.g. stocks) having a different impact on the propagation of shocks.
Accounting for these heterogeneities in network and economic mod-
els can lead to mathematical intractability very fast. A different approach,
which may lead to a more accurate representation of the financial system,
despite being unable to render an analytical solution to understand the
problem, is to use agent-based simulation, as we describe bellow.
3 Agent-Based Computational Finance
Much of the work in economics and finance hopes to simplify human inter-
actions and behaviors in a way that we can analyze these systems through
aggregated macro-features. But complex systems involves complex interac-
tions among many individuals and, in some cases, this complexity makes
the use of analytical models to understand the system unfeasible. For this
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reason, agent-based models and simulations have become an invaluable tool
for understanding the dynamics of the economic and/or financial system as
a whole.
Agent-based models are a class of computational models used to
simulate the actions and interactions of autonomous agents (Gilbert (2008)).
In computational economics, these models have been used to study proper-
ties of markets by building and simulating markets, especially in the field
of computational finance and there are many ways in which agent-based
models can be used to study financial markets 1
The building of artificial markets is one of the most important con-
tributions of agent-based models to the study of financial systems. They
allow us to model economic agents according to a theoretical model and
to observe if our economic assumptions about the agents interactions in a
financial setting would generate the expected dynamics.
Since the eighties some models of artificial markets have been tried,
specially for stock markets. Cohen et al. (1983) tried to look the impact
of random behaving agents on various market structures, while Kim and
Markowitz (1989) used discrete event simulation to model the interactions
of different kinds of trading agents and De Grauwe et al. (1995) focused on
the dynamics of foreign exchange markets.
One of most notable and most sophisticated markets is the Santa Fe
Institute (SFI) market. The SFI market was created with the idea of modeling
a financial market with an ecology of trading strategies (LeBaron (2002)). The
SFI Market structure were modeled to consider preferences and risk aversion
1A broad discussion of how market microstructure can be studied by simulations with
intelligent agents can be found in Chan (2001), while LeBaron (2006) discusses how agent-
based models can be used to build artificial markets and Tsang and Martinez-Jaramillo (2004)
discusses other examples of agent-based models uses in computational finance
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in trading and even allowed the emergence of trading patterns over time
through the use of genetic algorithms. Although there have been several
generations of the SFI artificial market, consisting of modifications of the
market structure and of different programming platforms, the fundamentals
of the theoretical model have persisted 2.
Other artificial stock markets have been designed focusing on fea-
tures not included in the SFI artificial market model. For instance, LeBaron
(2001b) and LeBaron (2001a) have used a new framework including varying
forecasting horizons and memory lengths, which is crucial in the conver-
gence to a rational expectations equilibrium, while Serguieva and Wu (2007)
have investigated herding behaviors as a possible reason for contagion
among different markets, and Martinez-Jaramillo and Tsang (2009) have
elaborated an artificial market in which trading behaviors model technical,
fundamental and noise traders, being able to recreate statistical properties
of price series in real financial markets.
Outside of stock markets, Arciero et al. (2008) developed a model
of real time gross settlement paying system for predicting the impact of
disruptive events in the flow of interbank payments and Llacay and Peffer
(2010) developed a model to simulate crisis and risk management in fixed-
income markets.
Agent-based models of financial markets have allows to simulate and
recreate episodes observed in historical data to assess economic theories. In
this work we focus on building an artificial repo market and it’s behavior
under a liquidity shock.
2A description of the SFI market model can be found in Arthur et al. (1996) and Palmer
et al. (1994) while an overview of the SFI market history can be found in LeBaron (2002)) and
in Johnson (2002)
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4 The Artificial Repo Market Model
To simulate the dynamics of financial contagion in the repo market we build
an artificial financial market where financial agents must manage their risk
and may face defaults and bankruptcy if there are significant imbalances
between their balance sheets. The financial risk is measured and controlled
trough losses, liquidity and leverage metrics.
Our artificial market structure is designed to reflect financial interme-
diaries that may choose to invest in a set of tradeable assets from outside the
financial system (representing economic projects) and that can also make
operations among themselves to improve resource allocation.
We design three types of financial intermediaries as agents, which
can be banks, money market funds (MMFs) or hedge funds. These interme-
diaries interact with each other trading assets according to their roles, as
described bellow, and with an optimization strategy. Every intermediary
tries to maximize their gains while managing their risk.
4.1 Assets
For the assets that can be traded by the agents, there is a risk free government
bond, a stock, representing a risky liquid asset, and a risky fixed-income
asset (from this point only called risky asset), representing a economic
project financed and securitized by banks. The intermediaries can also trade
resources through interbank lending and repurchase agreements. These
serve as instruments for them to improve resource allocation, and manage
risk.
List of Assets:
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A) Government Bond
In our market there is a government bond, consisting of a risk free
asset, paying a constant interest rate, r f = 0.10. This asset has complete
liquidity as there is we assume there are external agents willing to
match the order imbalance (treasury, foreign investors, central banks,
etc.).
B) Stock
There is also a risky stock, similar to the one described in LeBaron
(2002), paying stochastic dividend following the autoregressive pro-
cess:
dt = d¯ + ρ(dt−1 − d¯) + µt (1)
with d¯ = 10, ρ = 0.95 and µt ∼ N(0, σ2µ). The price of the stock is
determined endogenously in the market.
C) Risky Asset
There is a risky asset paying a constant interest rate rr = 0.11. This
asset represents an economic project financed by banks and securitized
in the capital markets. This asset can lose liquidity fast and may be
a major source of risk. Since we do not implement mark-to-market
calculation of bond prices, mainly because there are no variation in
Government Bond interest rates, the higher interest rate reflects exclu-
sively the perceived liquidity risk and the default risk of the asset.
D) Interbank Loan
Interbank lending play a key role in the financial system. They are
vital for banks’ liquidity management.The interbank lending market is
constituted by unsecured loans (the interbank loan) and secured loans
(through repurchase agreements and described bellow).
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The interbank loan is an operation where banks extend loans to one
another for a small term. In our model they are used when banks
don’t have access to secured loans and must meet liquidity or cash
requirements to avoid a default. The interbank loan has an interest
rater rIL = r f + δi where δi is the risk premium paid by the borrower
and:
δi =
∑j ILij
∑ Ai × Psell(A) (2)
where ILij is the value of interbank loan issued from bank j to bank i,
Ai is the total value of asset A owned by the bank i and Psell(Ai) is the
probability of selling the asset A at each timestep, which is determined
by the liquidity index of the asset, defined in Subsection 4.3. Interbank
loans are always overnight.
E) Repurchase Agreement
Repos are a key mechanism in our fixed-income market. Repos require
margining practices, where the borrower pays an initial margin, or
‘haircut’, to provide some protection to the lender in case the other
party defaults.
In our market, we implement a simplified version of repo operations3.
Repos can be backed up by Government Bonds or by the Risky Asset.
Also, repos, as interbank loans, are always overnight, but can be
renewed at each time step. We also implement margining pratices
with the haircut being calculated as:
Haircut = 1− Psell (3)
3See Livingston (1999) for a more complete explanation of repo operations in real markets.
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This means that assets with full liquidity will not need a haircut, while
totally illiquid assets will require a 100% haircut, meaning the asset is
not acceptable as collateral. The repo is not renewed if the bank can
not meet the margin call. If the repo is not renewed the bank must
repay the repo, selling assets in the process if there is no available cash.
4.2 Financial Agents
Each financial agent type has a special role in the model. Banks intact with
the economic system by securitizing credit assets. Hedge funds mainly
operate in the stock market to provide volatility. MMFs interact with banks
in the money markets providing funding.
List of Financial Agents:
A) Banks
Banks are the central agents of our simulation. Banks can acquire the
risky asset at will (it represents the interaction of the bank with the
economic system) and may access the money market (composed by
MMFs) to obtain funding. Banks may also lend directly to other banks,
these operations are done in order to manage short-term liquidity.
B) Money Market Funds (MMF)
MMFs are mutual funds that serve as important intermediaries be-
tween investors who want highly liquid investments and banks that
have short-term liquidity needs (Rosengren and Stone Mountain (2012)).
As described by Rubin et al. (1999), MMFs are usually prevented by
regulation from engaging in leveraging practices and investing in
illiquid assets.
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In our model, MMFs act buying short-term and liquid debt instru-
ments, such as government securities, and providing liquidity to other
market players through repurchase agreements.
C) Hedge Funds
In our model hedge funds act as minor players. They operate in the
stock market and in the government bond market.
4.2.1 Trading strategies
Stock Trading
The role of the stock market is to provide a major source of volatility
and market risk to financial agents. Schwert (2011) have shown that stock
markets present high levels of volatility following periods of market stress.
Moreover, Ben-David et al. (2012) point out to the presence of severe funding
constraints, such as investor withdrawals and lender pressure accounting,
together with flight to quality (selloffs of high-volatility stocks) and static
liquidity management (selloffs of high-liquidity stocks) as major sources of
volatility and market downfall. These mechanisms play an important role
the modeling of the financial contagion.
For stock trading, the abstract model we used to simulate a real mar-
ket is similar to the Co-Evolutionary Heterogeneous Artificial Stock Market
(CHASM) described by Martinez-Jaramillo and Tsang (2009), but with some
key differences in trader behavior, order types and market mechanism.
Stock trading is composed by classes of traders that are used in
the literature and that represent trading behaviors in close resemblance to
empirical observations. They help recreate the statistical properties of a real
market:
13
1. Noise traders: The noise trader represent a stock trader who lacks
access to inside information and make erratic and irrational decisions
(De Long et al. (1990)).
A noise trader does not have any specific information about the secu-
rity or is not capable of making adequate analysis of the information
available to the market. If the efficient market hypothesis holds, noise
traders add liquidity to a market by increasing the trading volume.
In our artificial market model, these traders buy, sell, or hold their
positions with different probabilities pb, ps and ph, respectively. Each
trader has it’s own probabilities and the probabilities are defined
before the simulations.
2. Fundamental traders: Fundamental traders are stock traders which
adhere to the principle of fundamental trading or value investing.
They compare the true value they assess to the security with the current
market price of the security. They seek to buy securities for which the
market price is lower than the estimated true value (underpriced) and
to sell assets for which the price is bigger than the estimated true value
(overpriced).
The way fundamental traders are modeled is similar to the work of
Tsang and Martinez-Jaramillo (2004), they measure the true value
of the stock by the dividend being paid by the security (See Eq. 1)
and will change their position if the actual price deviates from the
perceived true value by a threshold value of τ. Each agent has a τ
value drawn from an uniform interval [τmin, τmax]
3. Technical traders: Technical traders use technical and momentum indi-
cators in the form of decision rules to forecast future stock prices. The
list of indicators is taken from Martinez-Jaramillo and Tsang (2009)
and are as follows:
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Moving Average:
MA(L, t) =
P(t)−
(
1
L ∑
L
i=1 P(t− i)
)
1
L ∑
L
i=1 P(t− i)
(4)
Trading Breakout:
TRB(L, t) =
P(t)−max{P(t− 1), ..., P(t− L)}
max{P(t− 1), ..., P(t− L)} (5)
Filter:
Filter(L, t) =
P(t)−min{P(t− 1), ..., P(t− L)}
min{P(t− 1), ..., P(t− L)} (6)
Volatility:
Vol(L, t) =
σ{P(t− 1), ..., P(t− L + 1)}
1
L ∑
n
i=1 P(t− i)
(7)
Momentum:
Mom(L, t) = P(t)− P(t− L) (8)
Moving Average Momentum:
MomMA(L, t) =
1
L
L
∑
i=1
Mom(L, t− i) (9)
The parameter L and and the forecasting rules are learned by Genetic
Programming and the method is described in Martinez-Jaramillo and
Tsang (2009), Tsang et al. (1998) and Li and Tsang (1999).
Fixed-Income trading
For fixed-income assets, while it is possible to use a sophisticated trad-
ing environment emulating bond arbitrage strategies, such as the one used
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by Llacay and Peffer (2010), we opt for a more simpler and straightforward
model.
All bonds (government bonds, risky asset) are traded in over-the-
counter markets, that is, by trades directly between parties. For simplicity
we assume that Government Bonds have complete liquidity and the order
imbalance will be matched by market players outside the model.
The Risky Asset can be acquired at will by banks, but cannot be sold
easily, they also have long maturity. Whenever a bank wishes to sell its
position in the risky asset, it must find another financial agent willing to
acquire it.
Interbank lending and Repurchase agreement operations
Secured and unsecured lending operations are carried out in a cen-
tralized manner. Banks use repurchase agreements as a leverage mechanism
to acquire funding in the money market. Interbank loans are carried out
whenever a bank is meeting short term liquidity issues.
4.3 Risk Management
Agents in our model manage their daily market risk, liquidity risk and
leverage to avoid bankruptcy.
Market Risk
Market risk is measured by Value-at-Risk (VaR). The VaR of a portfo-
lio is the potential loss in value of the portfolio over a defined period for a
given confidence interval. In general terms, the maximum loss is calculated
as a function of the portfolio historical volatility σp (Borodovsky and Lore
(2000)). In the model all financial agents use the VaR Delta-Normal approach
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described in Linsmeier and Pearson (2000). In this approach, given that a
financial agent will not tolerate a loss that will be equaled or exceeded by x
percent in a given time interval and the VaR is measured as:
VaR = −[µ− xσ] (10)
where µ is the expected change in portfolio value.
Liquidity Risk
The financial concept of liquidity is elusive. Market participants
perceive a financial asset as liquid if they can sell a large amount of the asset
without affecting its price, but this concept is hard to quantify and there
is no single theoretically and universally accepted measure for liquidity
(Lybek and Sarr (2002)).
As our liquidity metric we use the order imbalance to measure the
probability of selling a asset at a given time step t as:
Psell(t) = 1−
max{0, (∑ni=i
OS(t− i)−OB(t− i)
n
)}
∑ni=i
OS(t− i)
n
(11)
where OS(t− i) is the volume of buy orders and OB(t− i) is the volume
of sell orders at time step i and n is the horizon of calculation. This simple
metric measures the probability that a agent wanting to sell an asset will
find a buyer for the asset. The horizon for looking past orders must be short
in order to capture the quickness of market liquidity deterioration.
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4.3.1 Leverage
Leverage is one of the most critical sources of risk in our model. We use a
simple leverage metric of:
Leverage =
TA
NAV
(12)
where TA stands for total assets and NAV is the net asset value of
the agent.
In our model only banks will leverage and they do so through bank
deposits and repos. Each agent will have a leverage limit which they can
not surpass which is sampled from a Pareto distribution.
4.4 Market Mechanism
The market works with each agent placing orders and managing their
metrics at each time step, during the specified time of the simulation. Agents
will have strategies and must manage risk.
The focus of our analysis is on the default of banks. If a bank can’t pay
an obligation due to shortage of funds, it becomes defaulted and will enter
fire sales to acquire funding. If they lack assets to pay all their obligations or
if illiquidity prevents them from turning assets into cash they must declare
bankruptcy and are removed from the simulation.
Trading
At each turn t each agent i makes a decision ei(t) ∈ {−1, 0,+1}, for
each asset, where +1 represents the decision to buy, -1 the decision sell and
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0 the decision to hold an asset. The decision of each agent is determined by
the trader class for stocks, and by it’s liquidity limit, VaR limit and leverage
limit for the stock fixed-income risky asset and lending operation, and is
unrestricted for risk-free assets. Depending on the value of ei(t), the trader
buys/sells a quantity qi(t) proportional to his current asset belongings and
free cash.
After the decisions are taken the orders are added to the order book
4. There is a order book for each asset.
The only price directly affected by orders is the stock price. The way
in which order imbalance affects stock prices is similar to the one in Giardina
and Bouchaud (2003), where the normalized total order imbalance is used
to determine the change of price and is denoted Qj(t):
Qj(t) =
1
φj
N
∑
i=0
qij(t) = Q+(t)−Q−(t) (13)
where φj is the total number of outstanding shares from the as-
set(assumed constant in the period of the simulation), Q+ is the volume
of buy orders and Q− is the volume of sell orders. Trades are cleared and
settled in a simple first in first out manner.
Interbank lending
Banks will use repos to leverage and buy the Risky Asset if their risk
limits allow and there is funding available in the money market. Repos are
initialized at the market creation and the operations are renewed as long as
the banks are bellow their limits and have resources available to renew the
4for simplicity, all orders are placed as market orders. Also, for simplicity, we consider
that all the trading is carried out at a centralized desk.
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operations. At the end of each turn, the banks that need short term liquidity
to net their positions will resort to the interbank landing market.
This sequence of steps is repeated for the duration of the simulation
and the only changing variable is the trading behavior of agents facing
defaults.
4.5 Failures, Fire sales and Contagion
Financial institutions may fail under a series of conditions. First, if their
assets value fall bellow a threshold they may become insolvent. The same
may happen if the agent is run and they are holding illiquid assets.
Failing institutions will enter fire sales, meaning that they will try to
liquidate their assets to make cash and terminate their obligations until they
become solvent again.
Fire sales won’t affect Government bonds, but will pressure stock
and the risky asset prices. The effect in stock prices is felt directly in the
price adjustment mechanism, and for the risky asset, it will suffer a discount
d for the volume of agents fire selling it.
Fire sales may also trigger margin calls in repos backed up by the
risky asset and will prompt mark-to-market losses. Mark-to-market losses
will require an immediate margin call to match the value of the debt and,
as a greater number of institutions starts to fire sell the risky asset, it may
become more illiquid, requiring an increase in haircut.
Institutions holding a greater amount of illiquid assets will also face
higher spreads while trying to acquire funding through interbank loans,
expanding their losses. If an agent can’t liquidate it’s positions and can’t
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obtain funding in the money market it is declared bankrupt and is removed
from the simulation.
4.5.1 Crisis simulation
Here we describe the structure of the simulation. First, we assume there is
a bubble associated with the risky asset which will burst at the beginning
of the simulation. As the price of the risky asset loses significant value and
liquidity, repos backed up by this asset will require margin calls and higher
haircut. These new requirements will make some institutions lose value
and deleverage, the institutions unable to meet the new requirements will
become defaulted and enter fire sales, triggering new losses in value and
liquidity. If they become too illiquid or their losses are substantial, they will
not be able to obtain funding in the interbank lending market and must
declare bankruptcy, being removed from the simulation. The contagion
process is characterized by the following algorithm:
1. Initially a bubble collapses, reducing the market value of the risky asset
to a p fraction of its original value, p ∈ [0, 1] and causing a reduction
in the probability of selling the asset by a fraction q, q ∈ [0, 1];
2. When the market deteriorates, each bank i owning the a m fraction
of the risky asset must book mark-to-market losses experiencing a
reduction in value by m ∗ (1− p) and, for each repo operation j of
amount n collateralized by the risky asset, there will be a margin call
of (1− p) ∗ n and a haircut increase by the fraction q;
3. The loss in value and liquidity will also make a number of agents
k be above it’s risk limits, triggering a fly to liquidity. These agents
will change their trading behavior to sell risky and illiquid assets to
obtain more liquid ones. These agents will not fire sell, but will fuel
21
the selling side of order book.
4. When a bank can’t meet the new requirements for haircuts they must
deleverage, possibly selling it’s assets in the process. If the bank
faces high illiquidity, it may not be able to deleverage and becomes
insolvent, entering fire sales to meet it’s obligations.
5. New fire sales will cause new price reductions and lower liquidity,
feeding the negative feedback loop.
Depending on the simulated scenario the contagion may stop briefly,
with no insolvency, or produce a cascade of failures. The model is sensitive
to a high number of parameters, such as the asset composition of of the
agents, risk limits, distribution of trading behaviors and and severity of the
initial crisis. In the next section we perform a simulation to illustrate the
model.
5 Simulation
5.1 Experimental Design
Our market will be composed of 100 banks, 200 hedge funds and 200 money
market funds. Initial NAVs are drawn from a Pareto distribution with
parameters a = 3 and mbanks = 1e8, mmm f = 2e8 5 and mhedge = 1e7. While
MMFs and Hedge Funds won’t start with an initial leverage, banks start
with deposits x × NAVbank where x follows a Pareto distribution with
parameters a = 3 and m = 1.
Each bank is assigned a maximum leverage from an uniform distri-
5Money market funds are created with comparatively high NAVs in order to represent a
range of institutional investors and financial intermediaries operating in the money markets.
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Figure 1: Liability composition of banks in the simulation. After initial market creation
liabilities are composed by NAV, bank deposits and repurchase agreements.
bution with parameters a = 3 and b = 7. After this assignment there is a
random assignment of repo operations between banks and money market
funds. Banks use these repo operations to leverage and invest in the Risky
Asset. Figure 1 shows the composition in the liabilities of the banks and
Figure 2 shows their portfolio composition. Other market parameters are
defined in Table 2.
Table 1: Summary of Financial Agents.
Agent Number of Agents Avg. NAV Avg. Leverage
Banks 100 1.66e8 3.781
Hedge Funds 200 1.71e7 1.000
MMFs 100 3.11e8 1.000
After the market creation we introduce a shock reducing the liquidity
of the Risky Asset by 30% and its price by 20%. The results from this
simulation are presented next.
23
Figure 2: Portfolio composition of banks in the simulation.Banks leverage to invest in the
risky asset.
Table 2: Parameters of the initial market.
Parameter Symbol Value
Noise traders probabilities (pb, ps, ph) (0.4, 0.4, 0.2)
Fundamental traders threshold τ unif(.1, .5)
Confidence level for market risk σ 5%
Time horizon of selling probability calculation n 3
Leverage limit for banks max leverage unif(4, 7)
5.2 Results
We focus on the analysis of the crisis over the banking system of our model
(i.e. the bank agents). At the beginning of our simulation we have 100 banks,
all solvent. Immediately after the shock seven banks become defaulted
and the situation worsens until reaching a new equilibrium with 43 banks
having gone bankrupt, as is shown in Figure 4.
The system also faces massive deleverage with the average leverage
falling from 3.781 to 2.644 and the required haircut increases up to 100%.
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Figure 3: Deleverage of the banking system as the the system suffers a run on the repo.
This means essentially that the repo market has frozen. All the remaining
leverage in the results are from bank deposits. In our results, the repo market
has evaporated as the result of our shock.
6 Final Remarks
Financial contagion is a complex phenomenon with devastating conse-
quences over the financial system. Here, we have developed a agent-based
model of the financial system that recreates some of the observed behav-
iors of financial institutions in the repo market in order to simulate a crisis
propagation.
While simple, the approach we have developed can be a valuable
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Figure 4: Number of solvent, defaulted and bankrupt at each time step in our simulation.
The system reaches a new equilibrium with close to 42% of the banks having gone bankrupt.
Figure 5: Market required haircut as the financial crisis spreads.
26
tool for financial supervisors and financial intermediaries, as they can help
assess the stability of the banking system and the resilience of individual
participants. For instance, the model can be used with as a stress testing
tool to understand the impact of a possible financial crisis over a market
segment to guide supervision and investment decisions.
While the results observed in our simulation are interesting, several
improvements are possible to make the model closer to real markets. To
advance this line of research: (1) The strategies in the fixed-income market
must be modeled to better represent the risk and behavior of participants in
this market(2) The effect of bankruptcy over asset prices, especially fixed-
income assets, needs to be better determined, and (3) More assets need
to be included in the model, to create a better representation of portfolio
allocations.
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